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## WEEKLY REPORT



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# THE SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM

25 August 1965

INTELLIGENCE AND REPORTING SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE INTERAGENCY  
VIETNAM COORDINATING COMMITTEE

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THE SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM

(19 August - 25 August 1965)

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(The Weekly Report on the Situation in South Vietnam is based on contributions from CIA, DIA, and INR; it is edited and published by CIA without final coordination. A fully coordinated Monthly report is disseminated on the first Friday of every month.)

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### THE WEEK IN PERSPECTIVE

Student opposition to the present military regime has become more vocal. Although still in a nascent stage, this opposition could develop into a serious problem for the Ky government. An ominous aspect is the apparent tie-in of militant Buddhist elements, under Tri Quang's leadership, with the student agitation. Tri Quang, who has remained in Saigon away from the center of student discontent in his normal habitat of Hué, and is not involving himself directly in this situation, continues privately to criticize the central government as being inefficient and unpopular.

A student "struggle committee" formed this week in Hué has issued a demand for early elections and a return to civilian government. Student agitators have seized on the government's recent mobilization decree, since modified, to charge that the military is seeking to gain control over intellectuals. Military Directory General Thieu, rather than Premier Ky, is emerging as the principal target of both the students and Tri Quang. The student protests have some overtones of anti-American sentiment, and the issue is susceptible to exploitation by Viet Cong and pro-neutralist elements.

Premier Ky, who returned this week from a round of apparently satisfying talks in Taiwan and Thailand dealing with general anti-Communist cooperation, has since been meeting with the other military leaders to discuss the student problem. Ky has exhibited great satisfaction over the US Marine victory against the Viet Cong near Chu Lai, but this operation has served to point up underlying sensitivity on the sovereignty issue on the part of other Vietnamese generals.

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
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August thus far has been a bad month for the Viet Cong; their recorded losses include 3,306 casualties, 936 military returnees, and 825 weapons. The three-week casualty totals already exceed previous comparable monthly totals of the war. Viet Cong capabilities for interdiction, sabotage, terrorism, propaganda, harassment, small attacks, and infiltration have not been impaired.

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## I. THE SITUATION WITHIN SOUTH VIETNAM

### A. POLITICAL SITUATION

1. In contrast to some encouraging developments in the military situation, the political climate in South Vietnam continues to be marked by weak spots and potential hazards. In particular, student criticism of the military government is becoming more vocal, especially in the acutely sensitive Hue area. Organized student opposition, as such, is in no more than a rudimentary stage; only very limited numbers of students have participated in the various meetings and peaceful demonstrations held to date, and the general public--thus far at least--has remained detached. However, aside from inherent opportunities for Viet Cong exploitation, an acute threat to long-range government stability exists in the increasingly obvious tie-in of militant Buddhist elements with student critics. Whether formidable student opposition develops will depend essentially on the government's dexterity in handling the issues involved and, at the same time, on the strategy and intent of the Buddhist leadership, which remains obscure.

2. A series of student meetings held in Hue last week end culminated in the formation of a so-called "Hue and Thua Thien Youth, Student, and Pupil Struggle Committee," opposing the present military regime in favor of a legally elected government. A manifesto issued by the committee accused the military of establishing a dictatorship under the "inefficient and dogmatic leadership" of Directory chairman General Thieu, who was singled out as the chief offender rather than Premier Ky. Anti-American overtones are also present in the student protests; there have been scattered references to national sovereignty being violated by "foreigners" and to the US replacing the French as a "colonial power."

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3. The main focus of student discontent presently is fixed on the manpower-mobilization decree issued recently by the defense ministry, which has since been modified. The original decree, which apparently was released prematurely without full cabinet sanction, provided that all persons between the ages of 28 and 37 holding a baccalaureate diploma or an equivalent degree were liable to enrollment in reserve officers school. As amended on 23 August, the decree now provides for a gradual rather than a wholesale call-up of "indispensable" civil servants and technicians--probably including university professors--and for their return after training to their respective departments. Although this modification may dissipate some of the unrest created by the original order, critics probably will cite it as an example of government irresoluteness.

4. Student accusations that the military is using mobilization as an excuse to fetter intellectuals reflect similar charges leveled in private by Buddhist leader Tri Quang. In a recent conversation with US officials, Tri Quang maintained that the mobilization order--even as amended--will generate opposition from all quarters that could result in toppling the government. He claimed that opposition to the decree had taken on the nature of opposition to Diem, in that discontent was general. Although typically taking pains to dissociate himself from direct complicity in the current student agitation, Tri Quang continues to manifest a basic hostility to the present regime.

5. General Ky, who returned on 22 August from a brief visit to Bangkok, is currently meeting in Dalat with other military leaders to discuss the student problem. Some impetus to these discussions has undoubtedly been given by the presentation in Saigon on 25 August of a list of student demands on the government. Unlike the Hue student protests, these demands did not call for elections to replace the present government, but

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did charge US involvement in Vietnamese affairs, and urged that Communist China be bombed to bring an end to the war.

6. The recent US Marine victory against the 1st Viet Cong Regiment just south of Chu Lai has clearly boosted Premier Ky's confidence in the war effort, but has also served to point up Vietnamese sensitivity on the issue of sovereignty. Some disparaging remarks heard from Vietnamese generals concerning this operation apparently reflected pique over the great amount of publicity given the US Marines. General Westmoreland has indicated that in the future all possible efforts will be made to include Vietnamese elements in the early stages of any large operation so that they can share the credit.

7. The underlying problem of Vietnamese sensitivity over evolving relationships with the US is also pointed up by a [REDACTED] just received of strong protests made earlier this month by northern commander General Nguyen Chanh Thi, who accused the US of taking unilateral military actions in his I Corps area. At the time, Thi's complaints were met with indifference by other members of the national military leadership, and Thi is reported to have stalked from the meeting. Thi, a "loner," has been identified in various reports as biding his time for a move to power in Saigon. Although firm evidence is lacking of such plotting by Thi, his xenophobic attitude has contributed to speculation by observers as to his ultimate designs.

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#### Economic Situation

8. Prices in Vietnam registered no sharp movements last week. The retail price index edged up by just 0.6 percent, and ample supplies of medium quality rice held its price stable and contributed to a decline in the price of a higher grade. Rice supplies in the central provinces should be adequately met for the next three months

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in view of the impending arrival at Da Nang of 22,000 metric tons of PL 480 rice and a coastal lift of 3,200 metric tons per month. Wholesale prices of United States-financed imports have been recently rising, however, and are now 3.4 percent higher than a month ago, and 6.4 percent above official levels.

9. The Mission has reported another example of Viet Cong impairment of the economy. Vegetable shipments coming into Saigon are far below normal (around 20 percent of previous levels) as a result of VC harassment of the Saigon/Dalat road. Higher costs of shipment due to the necessity of back-packing produce across road breaks, and VC taxes, reported to be around 330 piasters per ton, are likely to keep prices up and hold down demand in Saigon.

10. The Mission reports final agreement with the GVN in negotiations for a new piaster-dollar conversion rate for foreign personnel in South Vietnam. The purpose of the new rate is to divert a large volume of dollar conversions out of the black market into legal channels. An estimated \$50 million per year was being lost by the GVN through black market operations. The proposed new rate of 118 piasters per dollar compares with the present accommodation rate of 73 piasters per dollar and a current black market rate of about 130.

11. The Mission hopes to restrict the opportunity for illegal dollar conversions by institution of a military payment certificate (MPC) system for US personnel in South Vietnam. The GVN is planning to establish a limited free market at the new rate for certain invisible (service) transactions and to liberalize import regulations to reduce the demand for illegal dollars. The Mission hopes to initiate the new system on 31 August.

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12. South Vietnam's rubber exports declined markedly during the 2nd quarter of 1965 as a result of growing insecurity and transportation difficulties in plantation areas. Rubber export licensing for the 2nd quarter decreased by 30 percent compared to the same period in 1964. Rubber exports of 71,600 metric tons (\$33 million) accounted for almost 70 percent of South Vietnam's exports in 1964; rubber exports for 1965 are expected to be less than 60,000 metric tons.

Rubber production has declined as the result of military action in Phuoc Long and Tay Ninh provinces. Three plantations in Phuoc Long were abandoned as the result of air strikes during the Dong Xoai battle in June, and other plantations in the area are operating at reduced efficiency because plantation workers have fled. A plantation in Tay Ninh Province was abandoned in early July following a VC attack. Approximately ten percent of the plantation area, representing production of 6,000 to 7,000 tons of rubber, has been affected by these actions. Production through April had been comparable to 1964 production, but production in May dropped to 5,000 tons, compared to May 1964 production of 6,100 tons.

13. Transportation has also been a critical problem for the plantations since rubber must be shipped to Saigon, and food, petroleum and medicines for the plantations must be brought in. The GVN supplies periodic armed convoys for these purposes, and a tax payment to the VC can apparently guarantee security for additional transport. The rubber plantations have long been vulnerable to VC pressure, and some plantation owners admit paying taxes regularly to the VC. The payment of these taxes, the increasing cost of plantation needs, especially rice, and a recent workers' demand for wage increases have had an adverse impact on the profits of rubber plantations. The Plantation Owners' Association has been seeking to reduce GVN taxes on rubber exports, and it is possible that some plantations are holding back on exports in anticipation of favorable government action on this proposal.

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B. MILITARY SITUATION

1. The balance of military success favored the GVN this past week. The major Viet Cong activity was a two-battalion attack on the Dak Sut district headquarters and CIDG camp in Kontum Province in which elements of the 101st PAVN Regiment are believed to have participated. There were ten other attacks of lesser importance during the period. Overall Viet Cong activity declined from 642 incidents last week to 486 during this week. Sabotage and propaganda incidents remained about the same, attacks increased slightly, and terrorism and AA fire dropped considerably. Interdiction of lines of communication continued high.

2. For the second consecutive week, friendly forces had the better tactical results, scoring significant successes in areas held by the Viet Cong. In Quang Tri Province, the ARVN 1st Division drove deep to clear and hold 225 square kilometers of Viet Cong - controlled territory along the Quang Tri River. The action producing the most damage to the Viet Cong was Operation STARLITE by the US Marines in the Van Tuong peninsula just south of the Chu Lai airbase. This operation reacted rapidly to good intelligence and achieved complete surprise of the 1st Viet Cong Regiment. The operation employed amphibious, heliborne, and ground elements to encircle Viet Cong positions and seal escape routes. Heavy naval, air, and artillery bombardment plus persistent ground actions forced the Viet Cong into the open from their elaborate defensive positions. As a result of Operation STARLITE, the 1st Viet Cong Regiment is not now considered to be an effective fighting force.

3. Government large-scale (battalion size and larger) operations increased to 103 from 77 with a corresponding increase, to 48 from 38, in Viet Cong contacts. This did not hold true for small-scale actions; however, these declined to 20,532 from 22,047 and resulted in 131 contacts compared

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to the 155 of last week. Weapons losses dropped significantly this week (160 to 45), and casualties dropped by 100, mostly in the KIA and MIA categories.

4. Sea, river, CIDG, and psywar operations continued as usual with no unusually significant results.

5. During July, RVNAF assigned strength increased by 11,600 despite a decline of more than 4,300 in the Popular Force (PF). Overall recruiting, however, continued to be successful, and conscription enforcement is increasingly effective. As of 31 July the audited strengths of RVNAF were: Regular Force 274,446; Regional Force 111,256; Popular Force 144,669; total 630,371. The increase in Regular Force strength reflects the almost completed integration of the Coastal Force into the regular Vietnam Navy. The continued decline in PF strength is attributed by MACV to inadequate recruiting results and desertions, primarily in I, II, and III CTZs.

6. Sabotage acts against the road network increased from 13 to 16, and the threat of ambush persists. Friendly military traffic must be heavily escorted on most roads in I, II, and III CTZs. Sabotage has effectively closed several roads during the week; Route 1 is closed in southern Quang Ngai and Binh Thuan provinces, and Route 19 is passable only to the east of Pleiku city. All other roads into the highlands-- Routes 7, 14, 20, and 21--are interdicted. Inter-provincial Routes 10 in Hau Nghia Province, 1 in Phuoc Long Province, 17 in Kien Giang Province, and 40 in Phong Dinh Province are closed.

7. The railroad is partially functioning in Long Khanh, Binh Thuan, Khanh Hoa, Tuyen Duc, Ninh Thuan, Thua Thien, and Quang Tri provinces. Seven of the ten railroad sabotage incidents occurred in II CTZ.

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8. Viet Cong activity in I CTZ declined, but the pattern of activity continued as usual, with continued emphasis upon isolating population centers. In II CTZ the major Viet Cong action was the attack at Dak Sut: the district headquarters and CIDG camp were completely destroyed. Viet Cong activity in III CTZ decreased for the second consecutive week; there was no change in the status of lines of communication. In the Capital Military Region, the Viet Cong again applied pressure on the Hop Tac area, and two company-size attacks were conducted near Saigon-Cholon. The National Police also were the target of Viet Cong action: on four separate occasions the Viet Cong successfully harassed them and inflicted casualties. Activity in IV CTZ decreased across the board. The Viet Cong have sustained heavy casualties in this zone in recent weeks.

9. Total RVN casualties for the week were 634 (down from 738). These consisted of 120 KIA, 495 WIA, and 19 MIA compared to 214, 430, and 94 respectively for last week. Weapons losses totaled 45 (42 individual and three crew-served) compared to last week's 160 (155 individual and five crew-served).

10. Viet Cong personnel losses were down slightly from last week's 1,478 (1,330 KIA and 148 captured). This week's figures are 1,244 (1,009 KIA and 235 captured). In addition, they lost 318 weapons (311 individual and seven crew-served); last week these were 321 (314 individual and seven crew-served). The Viet Cong KIA figure--1,009--is the second highest weekly total of the war.

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### C. RURAL RECONSTRUCTION

1. USOM regional directors, in their July report, observe that the worsening military situation in the I Corps area is inducing a clearly discernible attitude of hopelessness among the provincial officials. First Corps commander General Thi continues to replace officials whom he distrusts, regardless of their demonstrated abilities, with those of demonstrated loyalty. Province chiefs in this northern region tend to blame shortcomings in provincial administration on a lack of support from Saigon, a view that reflects Thi's own outlook.

2. The general view of the III Corps area is that with the exception of Hau Nghia Province the situation is fairly constant. The only large-scale Viet Cong action in this corps area during July was in Phuoc Long Province. Viet Cong activity against communications lines has continued, as have acts of terrorism against the populace. In Hau Nghia Province, the GVN is gradually withdrawing from outlying areas, with the Communists filling the voids. Two demonstrations, possibly Viet Cong inspired, were conducted to protest the indiscriminate government use of artillery fire.

3. The security situation in IV Corps remains generally static, although there has been an increase in road minings and other harassing actions by the Communists. Several province chiefs were replaced in July. One such change, in Chuong Thien Province, indicates the growing influence of the Hoa Hao sect in the delta region. The Hoa Hao comprise only about one percent of the population in Chuong Thien Province, but they control the recently elected provincial council and now have an aggressive Hoa Hao province chief. In Phong Dinh Province, authority was recently granted to recruit 1,500 Hoa Hao into the Regional Forces--and a similar move is reportedly now under way in Chuong Thien Province.

4. According to GVN Chieu Hoi officials, a total of 2,697 persons returned to government control during the period 14-21 August. Of this total, 155 were military, 58 were political cadres, 2,483 were civilians, and there was one draft dodger or deserter. Thirty-five weapons and 54 grenades were turned in. Although this week's total is higher than the 2,375 individuals who returned to GVN control last week, there were 367 fewer in the important military category.

5. In Chau Dac Province, 82 more Khmer dissidents rallied to the government from their safehaven in the Seven Mountains region of the province. Altogether, some 771 members of this minority group have come over to the government this month under the pressure of military action and through psychological warfare efforts.

6. Armed propaganda units, associated with the Chieu Hoi program, are proving to be so successful that 11 more companies are being planned for 1966. Province chiefs have especially welcomed these units and have expressed their desire to use more of them. Each of the propaganda units is composed of two sections of 36 men and two officers, all ralliers. Training consists of concentrated propaganda courses and intensive paramilitary instruction. A total of 663 men have been recruited, and 12 companies are either operational or in formation at the present time.

7. There are some indications from IV Corps that the psychological warfare efforts are causing the Viet Cong some concern. The Communists reportedly are holding mass meetings in villages to warn the inhabitants that anyone found picking up government leaflets may be shot. The Viet Cong are also telling the people that the government tortures Chieu Hoi returnees. The government has initiated counter-propaganda efforts in some villages to combat these Viet Cong efforts.

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## II. THIRD COUNTRY DEVELOPMENTS

### A. GVN VISITS TO ASIAN COUNTRIES

1. The GVN delegation led by Premier Nguyen Cao Ky and including Foreign Minister Tran Van Do and Minister of War General Nguyen Huu Co concluded its visit to Taiwan on 19 August, and arrived in Bangkok on 20 August. The visits took place at the initiative of the GVN and were designed partly to further Premier Ky's concept of an alliance of Asian anti-Communist states, as well as to develop greater coordination and cooperation among these states and obtain more assistance for the GVN.

2. The joint GVN/GRC communique, issued at the conclusion of the Taiwan visit, denounced Chinese Communist ambitions as the source of all troubles in Asia and especially in Southeast Asia, and called for the removal of the Communist threat. The communique also stated that the GRC was increasing its technical and material assistance to South Vietnam and was "prepared to respond to other requests for assistance from the GVN as a contribution to the struggle against the common enemy." The latter reference could be construed to suggest that the Nationalist Chinese would be willing to provide combat forces for South Vietnam. On his return to Saigon, Premier Ky told the press that President Chiang Kai-Shek had offered troops if the GVN needed and requested them, but press sources stated that the government was not likely to accept the GRC offer.

3. Ky's visit to Bangkok of 20-22 August was apparently devoted mainly to political and economic matters. Ky had several meetings with Prime Minister Thanom Kittikachon and Foreign Minister Thanat Khoman. At a dinner given by Prime Minister Thanom, Ky called for a regional organization of like-minded Asian states "with a view to mutual assistance and support" in order to "achieve more effective cooperation." The final joint GVN-Thai communique stated that the two states had "agreed to do what they can to develop closer relations" but made no reference to a more

formal arrangement. The communique also stated that the Thai Government had agreed to train Vietnamese pilots in Thailand and to increase the number of medical units in Vietnam. The Thai Government is also reported to have decided in principle to supply the GVN with two Thai-owned LST's to assist in offloading operations. The Thai have already indicated that they are in no position to supply combat troops to South Vietnam.

4. Prime Minister Ky told reporters in Bangkok that he plans to visit the Philippines, Malaysia, Singapore, and the Republic of Korea in the near future. However, Macario Peralta, Secretary of National Defense of the Philippines, told an American observer that it was not desirable for Ky to visit the Philippines until after the Philippine presidential election of 9 November.

#### B. FRANCE

1. In a recent conversation with an Embassy officer in Saigon, French Consul General Lambroschini stated strongly and directly his desire for closer contact. Lambroschini stated that he believed France would one day be called upon to play a great role in Vietnam, no matter how the current conflict was resolved, both at any peace conference and in the post-settlement period. He also noted the GVN had been cooperative since the breaking of diplomatic relations and that Foreign Minister Tran Van Do had specifically authorized the French to continue to use its Embassy building and secure radio communications equipment.

2. Several Quai officials have recently gone out of their way to express enthusiastically their personal view that a turning point may have been reached in Vietnam as a result of the US Marines' success at Chu Lai. One official stated he hoped that the United States would not harden its attitude toward negotiations after military success.

#### C. AUSTRALIA

The August Gallup Poll showed a marked increase in public support for the Australian commitment to South Vietnam as compared to the May survey. In August, 59 percent of the respondents indicated that

the government was right in sending 800 Australian troops to fight in South Vietnam, as compared to 52 percent in May. This increased support for Australian (and American) policy occurred during a period of concerted opposition by a diversity of individuals and groups.


D. SCANDINAVIAN NATIONS

1. As a result of growing pressures, both the Swedish and Norwegian foreign ministers have recently made statements criticizing United States bombing of North Vietnam which they fear may broaden the conflict. Swedish Prime Minister Tage Erlander has supported these criticisms. Norwegian Foreign Minister Lange called for a "pause" in United States air strikes for "the express purpose of seeking peace negotiations," as he doubted that the political objective which the United States sought to achieve through the bombings would be realized.

2. At the same time, both the Swedish and Norwegian foreign ministers have also criticized the Communists, including Communist China and the USSR, for their apparent unwillingness to enter into negotiations without prior US withdrawal from Vietnam. Norwegian Foreign Minister Lange stated that he considered the United States presence in South Vietnam as necessary to the security of Asia and other parts of the world.

3. However, the final communique of the Scandinavian foreign ministers meeting of 20 August (customarily held before the opening of the United Nations General Assembly session) was relatively innocuous, expressing deep concern over the dangerous situation in Vietnam and appealing to the parties involved to avoid steps that might widen the conflict and urging them to meet at the negotiating table without prior conditions.

## NORTH VIETNAM: SURFACE-TO-AIR MISSILE SITES



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### III. DEVELOPMENTS IN THE BLOC

#### A. MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS

1. Six new, fixed surface-to-air missile (SAM) sites, numbers 11 through 16, were disclosed this week. Analysis of 21 August photography revealed the first three: site 11 is situated about 15 miles southwest of Hanoi, site 12 is about 20 miles west of Hanoi, and site 13 is about 38 miles south of the DRV capital. Preliminary field analysis of high-level photography of 24 and 25 August revealed the presence of sites 14 through 16. Site 14 is situated approximately seven miles east of Hanoi, and sites 15 and 16 are 12 miles to the west. Only site 16 appears operational. The presence of this new batch of SAM sites suggests that the DRV is endeavoring to saturate its capital region with defensive missile installations to insure maximum protection from possible US air strikes.

2. A US navy F4B Phantom fighter was shot down by a SAM on 24 August while on an armed reconnaissance mission in the vicinity of the Thanh Hoa bridge. Preliminary information based on debriefings of other pilots in the area at the time of the shootdown suggests that the missile was fired from an as yet undetected site somewhere southeast of site 13. Armed reconnaissance aircraft have been flying almost daily missions in the Thanh Hoa area for a number of weeks now. It is likely that the missile equipment used in this shootdown had been moved into this area in anticipation of just such a target.

3. Photography of 17 August revealed revetment construction at Lang Son Airfield, some nine miles from the Chinese border. Lang Son is the seventh North Vietnamese airfield at which revetments of various sizes, many with jet exhaust slits, have been or are being constructed. The primary purpose of this work is probably to provide the North Vietnamese Air Force with suitable dispersal and recovery facilities for use at some future date.

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4. Hanoi also evinced concern this week over the possible loss of leftist support throughout the world as a result of its repeated rejection of third-party proposals to end the Vietnam war. A 20 August "Observer" commentary in the North Vietnamese Army journal, broadcast internationally by Hanoi radio, sought to counter this loss by spelling out what Hanoi considers necessary for mediation to be effective. The article asserted that if anyone wants to act as a mediator, "he cannot put the US aggressor on a par with the victims of aggression, i.e., the Viet Cong and the North Vietnamese. Potential mediators, the commentary advised, should not "recommend that both sides show less intransigence" but should work to "compel" the US to stop its "aggression."

5. As long as US aggression continues, the article declares, the Vietnamese are "resolved to resist." Hanoi and the Viet Cong usually say they are determined to resist "as long as the US aggressors remain in Vietnam." The 20 August article thus contains an implicit suggestion that a unilateral cease-fire by the US, not necessarily accompanied by a withdrawal of US troops, might provide the basis for starting negotiations.

6. In a move perhaps tied to the recent DRV effort to gain increased international backing for its position on the war in Vietnam, Hanoi announced on 23 August that a high-level North Vietnamese delegation headed by politburo member Le Duc Tho would arrive in Paris on 25 August in response to an invitation from the central committee of the French Communist Party (FCP). Prior to this, the US Embassy in Paris had been informed by Director Manac'h of the Asian Affairs Office of the French Foreign Ministry that his government had granted 15-day visas to a 12-man DRV delegation.

7. This will be the first high-level North Vietnamese delegation to visit a free world country. In addition to consulting with the FCP, the delegation will probably seek to line up support from other West European Communist parties

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for Hanoi's position on the war. Le Duc Tho has considerable experience in dealing with European Communist parties, and has been touring East European countries after attending the Rumanian party congress from 24 July to 2 August.

8. During the week, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) received a request from the Viet Cong for medical supplies. The request was transmitted through the British Red Cross Society, apparently on the basis of the British Cochairmanship of the Geneva accords and because the Viet Cong "Red Cross" is not a member of the ICRC. The committee has made contributions of 50,000 Swiss francs each to the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese Red Cross societies "for help to the victims of the war." It is the policy of the Red Cross to aid victims of war and disaster irrespective of political affiliation.

#### USSR

9. While in North Korea for the 20th anniversary of the liberation of the DPRK, Soviet party presidium member Shelepin asserted that the US "faced cruel disappointment" and "inevitable defeat" in Vietnam. In a speech on 18 August during his tour of North Korea, the Soviet official again pledged Moscow's determination to provide the DRV with "all necessary" defensive assistance, and asserted the USSR's "full support" for the North Vietnamese position regarding a Vietnam settlement. Shelepin reiterated the Soviet line stressing the need for "unity and cohesion" of all socialist countries in order to ensure a successful struggle against imperialism.




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

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# SOUTH VIETNAM BATTLE STATISTICS, 1965

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WEEKLY REPORT





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26 August 1965

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MEMORANDUM FOR: Recipients of the Publication,  
The Situation in South Vietnam,  
Weekly Report (OCI No. 0634/65)

SUBJECT : Replacement Page

Please substitute the attached page  
for the final page in the 25 August 1965  
Weekly Report.

